Cultural Influences in Negotiations: A Four Country Comparative Analysis

Lynn E. Metcalf
Orfalea College of Business, Cal Poly State University
San Luis Obispo, CA 93407
lmetcalf@calpoly.edu

Allan Bird
University of Missouri, St. Louis
8001 Natural Bridge Road, St. Louis MO 63121
abird@umsl.edu

Mark F. Peterson
Florida Atlantic University, USA
Florida Atlantic University College of Business
777 Glades Road, Boca Raton, FL 33431
mpeterso@fau.edu

Mahesh Shankarmahesh
University of Missouri, St. Louis
8001 Natural Bridge Road, St. Louis MO 63121
mahesh@umsl.edu

Terri R. Lituchy
Concordia University, John Molson School of Business
1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd West, Montreal, QC H3G 1M8, Canada.
TerriLituchy@yahoo.com

Key Words: cross cultural negotiation, international negotiation, negotiation framework,
negotiation orientations, negotiation tendencies
1

Cultural Influences in Negotiations: A Four Country Comparative Analysis

Abstract
Empirical work systematically comparing variations across a range of countries is scarce.
A comprehensive framework having the potential to yield comparable information across
countries on 12 negotiating tendencies was proposed more than 20 years ago by Weiss and
Stripp; however, the framework was never operationalized or empirically tested. A review
of the negotiation and cross cultural research that have accumulated over the last two
decades led to refinements in the definition of the dimensions in the framework. We
operationalized four dimensions in the Negotiation Orientations Framework and
developed the Negotiation Orientations Inventory (NOI) to assess individual orientations on
those four dimensions. Data were collected from a sample of 1000 business people and
university students with business experience from Finland, Mexico, Turkey, and the
United States. Results are presented and further scale development is discussed. Findings
establish the utility of the dimensions in the framework in making comparisons between
the four countries.
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Cultural Influences in Negotiations: A Four Country Comparative Analysis

The effects of cross cultural differences on international negotiation are widely
acknowledged. Cohen (1997) notes that cultural factors can complicate, prolong, and
frustrate negotiations. While there is substantial empirical evidence that negotiating
tendencies differ by culture (see Adair et al., 2001; Graham et al., 1994), much of the
information that is available to an expanding corps of international negotiators about
negotiating behaviors in countries around the world is descriptive (Elashmawi, 2001;
Foster, 1992; Gesteland, 1997; Moran and Stripp, 1991; Morrison et al., 1994; Salacuse,
2003). Negotiators may find themselves relying on very basic lists of dos and don’ts (see
CultureGrams, 2005; Morrison et al., 1994), which may or may not contain tips
relevant to negotiating. Moreover, the items included in the lists are generally not
comparable across countries. Empirical work that systematically compares variations
across a range of countries is scarce (Metcalf and Bird, 2004). The conventional wisdom
presented in Table 1, summarizes the type of information available to a negotiator for
the four countries that are the subject of this study. What the table makes clear is the
lack of information on some countries, the stereotypical nature of what is available, and
the contradictions that exist – without explanation – between widely available sources. In
this era of increased global cooperation, it is imperative that negotiators be equipped
with a better understanding of the behaviors they might expect at the negotiating table.
Negotiators need information about the negotiating tendencies they are likely to
encounter in a given country and, because a growing cadre of negotiators conduct
business in several, or even many, different countries, they also need access to a
systematic comparison of negotiating tendencies across a wide range of countries.

---------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
----------------------------------

A number of models that would permit comparisons between countries have been
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proposed. These models capture the myriad influences on international negotiating
behavior (see Berton et al., 1999; Cellich and Jain, 2004; Cohen, 1997; Ghauri, 2003;
Salacuse, 1991; Weiss and Stripp, 1998) and can be classified according to the
comparative, micro-behavioral (cross cultural) paradigm identified by Weiss (2004)
in his review of the international negotiation literature. The micro-behavioral
paradigm directs attention to the face-to-face interaction between negotiators, with
particular interest in the orientations and behaviors of negotiators, as well as the effect of
contextual factors. Streams of empirical research in this paradigm include, for
example, the work of Graham and his associates (Graham, 1984; Graham and Lin,
1987; Graham et al., 1988) on comparative negotiation, and Brett and associates (2000,
2001) on intercultural negotiation. While shedding light on cultural differences in
negotiating behaviors, these streams of empirical work were limited in focus to three
or fewer negotiating tendencies or styles.

A comprehensive framework having the potential to yield comparable information
across countries on 12 negotiating tendencies or styles was proposed more than 20 years
ago by Weiss and Stripp (1985). The framework was conceptual and the 12 dimensions
in the framework were loosely defined, with considerable overlap among them.
Moreover, the dimensions comprising the framework were not clearly linked to the body
of negotiation and cross cultural research. The authors’ intent in developing the
framework was to sensitize researchers and practitioners to possible culturally based
differences in negotiation attitudes, behaviors, and contexts (Weiss and Stripp, 1998). At
the time the model was developed, systematic comparative research on international
business negotiations was rare. Perhaps for that reason, the framework received almost no
attention and was never empirically tested.

The goals of our work over the past several years have been (1) to ground the work
in the relevant bodies of negotiation and cross cultural research that have been built
up over the last two decades; (2) to remove conceptual ambiguity and to propose
modifications in the original framework that would allow empirical testing; and (3) to
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operationalize the dimensions in the model. As a result of our work, 12 dimensions have
been substantially redefined and reinterpreted. In so doing, we conferred with Weiss to
ensure that we had remained faithful to the aims and to the content of the original
framework. Our reinterpretation of the framework (see Figure 1) is presented below as
the Negotiation Orientations Framework.

---------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
----------------------------------

While we have refined the conceptualframing of all of the dimensions in the
Negotiation Orientations Framework and are working to develop measures for all 12,
at this point, we have operationalized four of the dimensions in the model.
Consequently, the focus of this study is on the four dimensions that we have
operationalized: Basic Concept of Negotiation, Most Significant Type of Issue, Basis
of Trust, and Form of Agreement. The research reported in the remainder of this
article (1) describes the development and validation of scales for each pole of the
four dimensions listed, and (2) demonstrates how the resulting scales can be used to
identify country differences in negotiation orientations. First, we present definitions
for the four dimensions included in this study. Second, we describe how items for each
dimension were generated. Third, we use data from samples drawn from four countries
to select items based on factor analysis loadings and correlations. Fourth, we use
resulting scales and indicators to look at differences in negotiation orientations across
the four countries on the four dimensions.

The Negotiation Orientations Framework: Defining the Dimensions
Precise definitions provide the basis of good measurement and the means by which
subsequent research findings can be compared and synthesized (Churchill, 1979).
Developing precise definitions for each dimension and pole in the Weiss and Stripp
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framework led us to an extensive review of the literature on negotiation, cross cultural
psychology, and cross cultural communication. Refinements in the definition for all
12 of the dimensions have been presented in previous work (Metcalf and Bird, 2003). In
the interest of space, we limit the refinements presented below to the four dimensions on
which we compare the four countries included in this study.

Basic Concept of Negotiation (BCN): Distributive vs. Integrative
Basic Concept of Negotiation refers to how each party views the negotiating process.
Consistent with Walton and McKersie’s work (1965), we proposed a bipolar dimension,
with the orientation that negotiators bring to the negotiating process being either distributive or
integrative. The assumption underlying distributive bargaining strategies is that one party gains
at the expense of the other the size of the pie is fixed. In contrast, the assumption underlying
integrative bargaining strategies is that both parties place different values on the issues being
negotiated and that each party can find effective trade-offs by conceding less important issues to
gain on more important ones the size of the pie is not fixed (Bazerman and Neale, 1992).
Integrative negotiation involves both cooperation to expand the pie and competition to divide the
pie between the two parties (Adair and Brett, 2004).

Distributive (BCN-D)
Negotiators from countries that fit this profile believe that there will be one winner and
one loser (Mintu-Wimsatt and Gassenheimer, 2000). Consequently, the negotiator’s
goal is to establish dominance in the negotiation (Donohue and Ramesh, 1992).
Negotiators take a hard-line approach, seeking to meet only their own goals or interests,
in order to maximize the benefit for their side (Li and Labig, 1996). Negotiators assume
their interests directly conflict with those of the other party (Bazerman and Neale,
1992). As a result, negotiators demonstrate a strong concern for themselves and little
concern for others. Their goal is to induce the other party to alter attitudes and positions,
which may be accomplished either by using promises or threats (Graham and MintuWimsatt, 1997) or by remaining polite and neutral (DeMente, 1987). Their aspiration
levels may be high and rigid, which makes them resistant to making concessions
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(Chan, 1998). Alternatively, in order to exploit their position to the greatest extent,
negotiators may continuously adapt their strategy based on the other party’s actions
(DeMente, 1987). The atmosphere may be contentious or frustrating and a competitive
outlook dominates, as negotiators focus on the need for the other party to concede
(Gelfand et al., 2001).

Integrative (BCN-I)
Negotiators from countries that fit this profile believe that mutually beneficial
solutions can be generated. Consequently, integrative negotiators take a problem-solving
approach, where the focus is on exchanging information in order to identify the underlying
issues and interests of both sides and to generate outcomes that benefit both parties.
Negotiators adopting integrative behaviors attempt to understand the underlying issues
and their relative importance to both parties. Their goal is to capitalize on the different
interests of both parties so as to find effective trade-offs. Negotiators concede on less
important issues in order to gain on more important ones (Bazerman and Neale, 1992).
Negotiators not only share information about their own interests but also seek to obtain
information about the other party’s interests. Through the process of exchanging
information, both parties react to each other’s arguments and adjust their initial stances
on the issues (Putnam and Holmer, 1992). Negotiators reach agreement not by
compromise (giving in) but by employing creative problem-solving approaches to
develop solutions that expand the size of the rewards available to everyone.

Most Significant Type of Issue (MST): Task- vs. Relationship-based
Most Significant Type of Issue refers to the types of issues negotiators spend more time
discussing. Consistent with previous work (Pinkley, 1990), we proposed a bipolar
dimension, with task- and relationship-based issues as the endpoints. Negotiators with a
task frame focus on specific issues having to do with the project at hand, and place
emphasis on exchanging information regarding various alternatives. Importantly,
negotiators with a task frame view these issues as being external to the relationship
(Gelfand et al., 2001). In contrast, negotiators with a relationship frame focus on the
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relationship that exists between the two parties. Considerable time is spent on the process
of getting to know the other party and on establishing rapport between members of
negotiating teams (Simintiras and Thomas, 1998).

Task (MST-T)
Negotiators from countries where task issues are more important spend most of their time
discussing specific operational details of the project, as opposed to broad objectives. They
tend to negotiate a contract in an item-by-item way (Victor, 1992). Negotiators feel
that it is important to come away with a clear understanding regarding the control,
use, and division of resources (e.g. profits, management, ownership, and so forth).

Relationship (MST-R)
Negotiators from countries where relationship issues are more important spend most of
their time engaging in activities that build trust and friendship between the members of
each team, and discussing broad objectives (e.g. the intent of the parties to work together
and mutual long-term interests). A good relationship must be established before task
issues can be discussed. As the social relationship develops, task issues will be blended in
and eventually resolved (Victor, 1992).

Basis of Trust (BOT): External to the Parties vs. Internal to the Relationship
Trust is one party’s belief that the other party will take action to honor agreements that
have been reached (Wilson and Moller, 1991). In all countries, trust provides the
foundation on which both parties to a negotiation can work together. However,
negotiators from some countries trust that the other party will fulfill its obligations
because there is a signed contract and the sanction of law to back it up, while
negotiators from other countries trust that the other party will fulfill its obligations
because of the relationship that exists between them.

External to the Parties (BOT-E)
Negotiators trust the other party because a contract has been negotiated and agreed
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to, which can be litigated and enforced (Fukuyama, 1995). The legal system and
governmental agencies are viewed as providing an adequate, reliable, and effective
underpinning for commercial transactions. A partner will honor the terms of the contract
because the legal system will impose sanctions otherwise. The written word is binding;
a deal is a deal (Trompenaars, 1993). In this context, a trustworthy partner is simply one
who complies with the law.

Internal to the Relationship (BOT-I)
Negotiators trust the other party because they have invested in a relationship that has
been built up over time and they believe that the other party is committed to it. The
relationship between the parties is what matters; the contract is simply a symbol of the
bond between the parties who drafted it (Victor, 1992). Consequently, less emphasis is
placed on detailed, written contracts. Negotiators expect that the other party will
consider unique and changing circumstances over the life of the relationship. A
trustworthy partner is one who strives to maintain the relationship, possibly by
modifying an existing contract to reflect new developments (Trompenaars, 1993).

Form of Agreement (FOA): Explicit Contract vs. Implicit Agreement
This dimension refers to the preferred form of agreement between the parties: either
formal written contracts or informal oral agreements. This bipolar dimension is strongly
supported by the literature. Formal written contracts clearly specify desired partner
actions, the degree to which both parties to the agreement will cooperate and conform to
each other’s expectations, as well as the penalties that one party can extract should
the other party fail to perform. On the other hand, informal agreements often consider
the historical and social context of a relationship and acknowledge that the performance
and enforcement of obligations are an outcome of mutual interest between parties
(Frankel et al., 1996).

Explicit Contract (FOA-EC)
Negotiators favor and expect written, legally binding contracts (Weiss and Stripp, 1985). A
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written contract records the agreement and definitively specifies what each party has
agreed to do (Trompenaars, 1993). Consequently, negotiators believe that written
agreements provide the stability that allows their organization to make investments and
minimize the risk of business loss (Frankel et al., 1996).

Implicit Agreement (FOA-IA)
Negotiators favor broad or vague language in a contract because they feel that definitive
contract terms are too rigid to allow a good working relationship to evolve. Particularly
with new relationships, negotiators may feel that it is impossible to anticipate and
document every conceivable contingency. They may also believe that contracts inhibit
the parties from exploring unexpected or unusual opportunities for improvement and
success. Negotiators view the contract as a rough guideline, not because they want to
evade responsibility, but because the relationship, not the contract, is primary
(Trompenaars, 1993). In some cases, an oral contract may suffice.

With the dimensions defined in terms of extant bodies of research, we sought to develop
measurement scales that could be used to assess tendencies in negotiating behaviors
across countries. In the next section we describe how items for each dimension were
generated, and use data from samples drawn from four countries to select items based on
factor analysis loadings and correlations.

Methodology Item Generation
Through an extensive review of the literature (a subset has been included earlier), which
included a review of items used in previous studies to assess elements of cross cultural
negotiating behavior and related concepts (Adair et al., 2001; Adler et al., 1992;
Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 2000; Salacuse, 1998; Triandis, 1995), descriptions
of behaviors exemplifying each pole of each dimension were identified. These
descriptions of negotiating behaviors were converted to statements, yielding 29-nine
items, which were scored by respondents on a 5-point Likert scale, with endpoints
‘strongly agree’ and ‘strongly disagree’. Of the 29 items, 12 were intended to measure
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Basic Concept of Negotiation (BCN), six each were intended to measure Most
Significant Type of Issue (MST) and Basis of Trust (BOT), and five items were
intended to measure Form of Agreement (FOA).

Following the literature, items for the distributive pole of Basic Concept of Negotiation
(BCN-D) incorporated such ideas as the following: a win–lose perspective, the
assumption that one party’s interests would directly conflict with those of the other
party, an interest in seeking dominance over the other party, and a hard-line approach.
Items for the integrative pole of Basic Concept of Negotiation (BCN-I) focused on
information sharing, making trade-offs, and mutually beneficial outcomes. The task
pole of Most Significant Type of Issue (MST-T) was represented by items pertaining
to a focus on details, hammering out operational issues, and negotiating contracts in an
item-by-item fashion. The relationship pole of Most Significant Type of Issue (MSTR) was represented by items that captured the importance of establishing a relationship,
taking a long-term perspective, and focusing on broad objectives. Basis of Trust –
External (BOT-E) included items that focused on the written word as binding, as well as
basing trust on a signed contract. On the other hand, Basis of Trust – Internal (BOT-I)
focused on contracts as flexible instruments and trusting the other party because a
relationship had developed between them. Finally, the items representing Form of
Agreement – Explicit Contract (FOA-EC) focused on the expectation of generating a
legally binding contract and a dependence on written agreements that specified each
party’s obligations. The items representing Form of Agreement – Implicit Agreement
(FOA-IA) focused on general, loosely structured contracts, and whether or not an oral
contract was satisfactory. The 29 items representing these four dimensions comprised
our research instrument, the Negotiation Orientations Inventory (NOI).

Countries
It was important to determine whether or not scales could be developed that were
meaningful to people not only in the United States, where the Weiss and Stripp
framework was developed, but also to people in substantially different nations. With the
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intent of pushing out the range of variation between cultures, the four countries
selected for consideration in this study were drawn from different cultural clusters.
Ronen and Shenkar (1985) originally proposed the notion of cultural clusters and,
more recently, the GLOBE research project (House et al., 2004) adopted a similar
cluster approach. The premise underlying the notion of cultural clusters is that,
because of reasons of geographic proximity, common language and historical
relatedness, similarities in values and beliefs may be found among a group of national
cultures. Four cultural clusters are represented in this study: Finland is classified in
the Nordic/Scandinavian cluster; Turkey in the Near Eastern/Middle Eastern cluster;
Mexico in the Latin American cluster; and the USA in the Anglo cluster (House et
al., 2004; Ronen and Shenkar, 1985).

Survey Instrument
The English-language NOI was translated into Finnish, Mexican Spanish, and
Turkish by research colleagues in Finland, Mexico, and Turkey, respectively. To
ensure that NOI items had been translated accurately, each translation was compared
with the original English-language version by bilingual scholars familiar with cross
cultural negotiation concepts. The NOI items were also reviewed to ensure that the
negotiation concepts and behaviors they represented could be appropriately applied in
the Finnish, Mexican, and Turkish business environments.

Participants
A sample of business people and university students with business experience was drawn
from executive MBA programs in Finland, Mexico, Turkey, and the USA. Data were
collected from 147 men and women from Finland, 327 from Turkey, 192 from
Mexico and 327 from the USA. Chi square test results show demographic differences
between the samples. Finnish and Indian respondents were predominantly male, whereas
respondents from the other three countries were more evenly divided. US and Indian
respondents were younger than Mexican and Turkish respondents. Indian
respondents were better educated than the respondents from the other four countries.
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Finally, 45% of the Indian sample reported having either middle management or toplevel executive experience, with 39% for Mexico, 28% for Tu r k e y , 1 4 % fo r t h e US,
a nd 12% for Finland. Differing demographic profiles across countries is not uncommon
in multicountry studies involving multiple countries and multiple investigators (see the
GLOBE project). In our analyses, national differences in negotiation orientations
remained after controlling for demographic differences.

Item Analyses
Pan-cultural and within-culture factor analyses and correlation analyses were used: (1) to
evaluate whether the items designed to represent each construct actually did so, and (2) to
improve the scales. Two criteria for determining whether or not one of the intended
scales could be constructed for a given country were (1) that a sufficient number of the
intended items loaded on the factor for which they were designed, and (2) that a scale with
reliability (or an alpha) of over .60 could be produced in each country. Additional
considerations were item clarity and face validity. The majority of our scales simply did
not work as intended. In developing items, we followed the literature and carefully
included items that reflected both poles of a dimension. The assumption was that we
could reverse code items representing the opposing end of a given pole and include
them in a scale. Doing so resulted in reliabilities well below the criterion we had set.
This led us to examine the possibility that, while the Weiss and Stripp model suggested
that the ends of a dimension (e.g. explicit contract versus implicit agreement) could be
viewed as polar opposites, in practice, people may not think of them as such (e.g.
explicitness and implicitness are independent constructs). Others (see Oyserman et al.,
2002; Weiss, 2004) have come to similar conclusions – constructs that the negotiation
literature treats as bipolar appear to be better understood as distinct dimensions. As
Table 2 indicates, most scales suggested in theory to represent polar opposites in fact
have low negative or non-significant correlations.
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---------------------------------Insert Table 2 about here
----------------------------------

Consequently, we began to think in terms of eight negotiating tendencies, rather than
four dimensions each with two poles. While reliabilities improved substantially, many
were still modest. A search for the cause led us to rethink some concepts, such as Most
Significant Type of Issue, which really refers to a cluster of different but related
tendencies – the tendency to focus on aspects of the deal is different from the tendency
to negotiate contracts in an item-by-item fashion. Most Significant Type of Issue is a
multidimensional construct. As a result, items that assessed different aspects of Most
Significant Type of Issue could not be combined to form a single MST scale.

As shown in Appendix 1, we have single item measures for MST-T, MST-R, BOT-E,
BOT-I, and FOA-IA. We are confident that these single item measures faithfully
capture the essence of the respective constructs. We have multiple-item scales that
measure the FOA-E, BCN-D, and BCN-I (see Appendix 1).

Preliminary results suggest that there are similarities in the three scales that we retained
across countries, although reliabilities are typically best for the US, where the Weiss
and Stripp model was developed. In the following sections, we use the scales that we
found to be the most reliable and also several single-item indicators to look at differences
in negotiation orientations across the four countries on the four dimensions: Basic
Concept of Negotiation, Most Significant Type of Issue, Basis of Trust, and Form of
Agreement. As noted in the discussion, we also recognize that the scale development
analyses suggest that the basic concepts on which international negotiation theory rests
need to be rethought, and that new items need to be prepared to represent the revised
theory.

14

Results

Country Comparisons
To test whether or not the resulting scales and items could identify differences in negotiating
orientations, we conducted a MANOVA analysis predicting the full set of measures.
The results were significant, indicating that country differences in negotiating
tendencies do exist. Mean scores for each country on each of the eight negotiating
tendencies are reported in Table 3. To test for country differences individually
across each of the eight negotiating tendencies, we used Tukey’s Honestly Significant
Difference (HSD) test, which is the most powerful post hoc multiple comparison test for
evaluating a large number of pairs of means (Winer et al., 1991). Tukey’s HSD results
are also presented in Table 3. Chi square test results show significant differences in
response distributions across all four countries on all negotiating tendencies. As we
report the results, differences in response distributions will be discussed where they add
interesting insight.

The Negotiation Orientations Inventory scales and items appear to differentiate
between the four countries represented in this study. We focus first on results for each
negotiating orientation, and then move on to a consideration of the broader findings.

Basic Concept of Negotiation – Distributive (BCN-D)
As noted, the assumption underlying distributive bargaining strategies is that one party
gains at the expense of the other – the size of the pie is fixed. Mean scores for Turkey and
Mexico show respondents from these countries tending toward the ‘agree’ side of this
scale, indicating a distributive basic concept of negotiation. Significant differences in
mean scores for this negotiating orientation were observed between Turkey and the other
countries included in the study (Table 3), and also between Mexico and the other countries.
Turkish respondents showed a significantly greater tendency toward a distributive
orientation toward negotiation – 82% agreed with statements comprising the scale –
than respondents from the other three countries, with Finnish and US respondents
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showing the weakest tendency toward this orientation.

Basic Concept of Negotiation – Integrative (BCN-I)
The assumption underlying integrative bargaining strategies is that, because both parties
place different values on the issues being negotiated, effective trade-offs can be reached
by conceding on less important issues to gain on more important ones – the size of the
pie is not fixed. Mean scores for all four countries indicate a tendency for respondents to
view positively an integrative basic concept of negotiation. Eighty percent of Turks
are on the agreement side of this scale, which is surprising given their greater tendency
toward a distributive orientation. Despite the general tendency of respondents from all
countries toward an integrative basic concept of negotiation, this negotiating orientation
produced statistically different means between all pairs of countries, except for
Finland–Mexico (Table 3). Finnish and Mexican respondents showed the greatest
tendency toward an integrative orientation, with 99% of the Finns and 97% of the
Mexicans agreeing with the statements comprising the scale.

---------------------------------Insert Table 3 about here
----------------------------------

Most Significant Type of Issue – Task-related (MST-T)
Negotiators with a task frame focus on specific issues having to do with the project at
hand, and view these issues as being external to the relationship. Although the Finns
disagreed (74%) that it was most important to focus on the details, the mean scores for
the other countries indicate general agreement with this statement. With that said,
significant differences in mean scores on this item (see Appendix 1) were observed
between all pairs of countries except Turkey–USA (Table 3). Over half of the
Turkish and US respondents agreed that focusing on the details was most important.
The Mexican response was mixed, with 36% agreeing, 36% at neither, and 28%
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disagreeing that it was most important to focus on the details.

Most Significant Type of Issue – Relationship-based (MST-R)
Negotiators with a relationship frame focus on the relationship that exists between the
two parties. Interestingly, given the task- based orientation of US and Turkish
respondents, mean scores for all four countries agree that it is important to build trust
and friendship with members of the opposing team. Significant differences in mean
scores were observed between Turkey and all the other countries in the study, with
Turks the least likely to agree that it is important to build trust and friendship (Table
3).

Basis of Trust – External (BOT-E)
Negotiators with this frame of reference trust that the other party will fulfill its
obligations because there is a signed contract and the sanction of law to back it up.
Mean scores for all four countries indicate that respondents trust the other party
because a contract has been negotiated and agreed on (Table 3). Surprisingly high
percentages of Mexican (58%) and Turkish respondents (46%) agreed with the
statement – with respondents from both countries showing a stronger tendency to
agree than respondents from the United States (43%). In fact, US respondents showed the
strongest tendency to disagree with this statement (27%) versus 17% for each of the other
three countries.

Basis of Trust – Internal (BOT-I)
Negotiators whose basis of trust is internal, trust that the other party will fulfill its
obligations because of the relationship that exists between them. Mean scores for
Finland, Mexico, and the United States show a clear orientation toward trust based on
relationships. Seventy-one percent of Finnish respondents agreed with the statement ‘I
trust the other party because we have developed a relationship’. On the other hand,
only 29% of Turkish respondents agreed with the statement. Significant differences in
mean scores were observed between Turkey and all the other countries (Table 3).
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Form of Agreement – Explicit Contract (FOA-EC)
Negotiators with this frame of reference favor and expect written contracts. Mean scores
for all four countries indicate a preference for a legally binding written agreement, with
more than 75% of the respondents in each country either agreeing or strongly agreeing.
Percentages of respondents on the agreement end of this scale were 83% (US), 82%
(Finland), 80% (Mexico), and 78% (Turkey). The only pair of countries for which
this scale produced a significant difference in means was Finland–Turkey, with the
Finns showing the stronger preference for a contract (Table 3).

Form of Agreement – Implicit Agreement (FOA-IA)
Negotiators that favor implicit agreements acknowledge that the performance and
enforcement of obligations are an outcome of mutual interest between parties the
relationship rather than the contract is primary. Mexicans and Turks showed the
strongest tendency to favor implicit agreements (Table 3), preferring broad contracts
that allow good working relationships to evolve. Finns showed the strongest tendency
to disagree (51 %) with this orientation. Implicit agreement produced significant
differences in mean scores for all pairs of countries except Finland–USA.

Discussion and Implications
Our objectives for this study were twofold. First, we sought to operationalize the
dimensions in the model and to gather data that would allow comparisons between
countries. Second, our intent was to establish the utility of the framework in
identifying country differences across four countries: Finland, Mexico, Turkey, and
the United States.

Scale Development
In general, our efforts to develop scales reflecting four of the dimensions in the
Negotiation Orientations Framework were not successful; however, the lack of success
provides direction for further measure development. Our attempt to develop scales for
18

four dimensions suggests that the notion of bipolar negotiation concepts needs to be
revised in two ways. One is that we should think in terms of eight separate constructs,
rather than four bipolar dimensions, each of which appears likely to have multiple subdimensions. That suggests a very different scale development approach from the one we
had anticipated. It also suggests that understanding intercultural negotiation is
considerably more complex than is appreciated in the current intercultural negotiation
literature. Osland and Bird (2000) noted that most cross cultural research looks at cultural
dimensions in a bipolar fashion, resulting in what they call ‘sophisticated stereotyping’
that does not capture the complexity within cultures and the underlying socioeconomic
and political contexts.

Country Differences
We did, indeed, find significant differences in negotiation orientations between Finland,
Mexico, Turkey, and the United States. For four of the negotiation orientations, we found
significant differences in mean scores for five of the six paired comparisons, as shown in
Table 3. Chi square test results indicate significantly different patterns of response for
all four countries on all negotiating tendencies. Although each country presented a
unique pattern of negotiation orientations, not surprisingly, countries were found to be
similar on some dimensions. For example, with the exception of Finland–Turkey, no
significant differences were found between pairs of countries on Form of Agreement–
Explicit Contract. These similarities and differences present the opportunity to explore
further interesting findings.

In Table 4, we present scores for each of the four countries on Hofstede’s (2001) four
work-related dimensions of national power distance (PDI), uncertainty avoidance (UAI),
individualism–collectivism (IDV), and masculinity–femininity (MAS). Additionally,
we report ‘as is’ and ‘should be’ scores from the GLOBE project (House et al., 2004)
for assertiveness. In the GLOBE study, assertiveness is linked to competition, dominance,
and toughness, whereas non-assertiveness is linked to a cooperative, submissive, egalitarian
outlook. ‘As is’ scores are descriptive of current conditions, whereas ‘should be’ scores
19

reflect preferred conditions. Hofstede’s work and the GLOBE findings provide insight
into the negotiation orientations demonstrated by respondents in our study.

---------------------------------Insert Table 4 about here
----------------------------------

Basic Concept of Negotiation – Distributive and Integrative
Respondents from all countries show a strong orientation toward an integrative basic
concept of negotiation. Additionally, sizeable percentages of respondents from all
four countries also demonstrate a distributive basic concept of negotiation, ranging from
32% (Finland) to 82% (Turkey). These results clearly indicate that Basic Concept of
Negotiation is not a bipolar dimension.

That Finns show an integrative basic concept of negotiation is not surprising. Lewis
(2004) notes that Finns seek early integration of their ideas in the planning of a project.
Hofstede’s (2001) work, showing the tendency for feminine cultures toward mutually
beneficial outcomes, also supports the Finnish integrative orientation; Finland’s score on
MAS (Table 4) is the lowest of the four countries. Likewise, GLOBE findings (House
et al., 2004) are consistent with our results, which show a relatively low percentage
of Finns with a distributive basic concept of negotiation. ‘As is’ scores (Table 4)
on assertiveness for Finland are the lowest of any of the four countries (higher scores
indicate assertiveness).

The dual Turkish orientation (both distributive and integrative) on basic concept of
negotiation is also consistent with other research findings. Turkey’s MAS score
(Table 4) is relatively low (Hofstede, 2001), which supports the Turkish integrative
orientation. Supporting the Turkish distributive orientation are the relatively high ‘as
is’ scores (Table 4) on assertiveness (House et al., 2004).
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Conventional wisdom indicates that Mexicans prefer win–win solutions – that is, an
integrative basic concept of negotiation. So it is somewhat surprising that over half of
Mexican respondents are also oriented toward a distributive, or win–lose, basic concept of
negotiation. Both Hofstede (2001) and the GLOBE project (House et al., 2004) report
results that are consistent with the Mexican orientation toward a distributive basic
concept of negotiation. Mexico’s MAS score is relatively high and this country’s
scores on assertiveness are also relatively high (Table 4).

As with Mexico, conventional wisdom for the United States suggests that negotiators
seek mutual gains whenever possible. Negotiation approaches promoted heavily
over the last decade in the United States emphasize a win–win orientation toward
negotiation (see Bazerman and Neale, 1992; Fisher and Ury, 1991). Consistent with
conventional wisdom, US respondents were oriented toward an integrative basic
concept of negotiation. Finally, slightly more than one-third of US respondents
showed a distributive orientation toward basic concept of negotiation, which is also
supported both by the GLOBE project findings (House et al., 2004) on assertiveness
(Table 4) and by the relatively high score for the United States on MAS (Hofstede, 2001).

Findings for all four countries suggest that negotiators should neither view the negotiation
process as adversarial, nor should they look at it as a forum for making unilateral
concessions. While negotiators from all four countries are oriented toward win–
win, the sizeable percentage of respondents in all countries, particularly Turkey, with a
win– lose orientation suggests that negotiators from other countries need to explore the
attitudes of the specific parties with whom they are negotiating. This, of course, is
prudent advice in all negotiation settings.

The preceding implication, as well as those for the other negotiation orientations, is
presented in Table 5. Our findings suggest that negotiators should prepare differently
from what the ‘conventional wisdom’ regarding negotiation orientations in these four
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countries might suggest (refer again to Table 1). Table 5 presents a number of practical
‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ that negotiators can take away from our empirical findings.

---------------------------------Insert Table 5 about here
----------------------------------

Most Significant Type of Issue – Task-related and Relationship-based
Respondents from all countries agreed that it was important to build trust and friendship
with members of the other negotiating team. In addition, a majority of US and
Turkish respondents agreed that it was most important to focus on details – a task
orientation. Our findings are consistent with Borgatta et al. (1954), whose work suggests
that task and relationship are independent qualities. On the other hand, the orientation
of respondents from each of the four countries on both dimensions is surprising given the
work of others (see Hofstede, 2001), which indicates that, in collectivist cultures,
relationships must be established between two parties before they can do any
business, and that personal relationships prevail over task considerations. Additionally,
Hofstede’s (2001) work indicates that task prevails over personal relationships in
individualist societies. Consequently, one would expect US and Finnish respondents
to be more task oriented, with Turkish and Mexican respondents being more
relationship oriented (Table 4). Our findings show a greater percentage of Finnish
respondents as having the strongest relationship orientation, with 93% of in
agreement, and the weakest task orientation, with 18% of respondents in agreement.
In contrast, Turkish respondents had the weakest relationship orientation (61% in
agreement) and one of the strongest task orientations (51 % in agreement).

Our findings suggest that negotiators should build rapport with Finns by discussing the
general themes and principles behind the negotiations before getting into the details of the
project. In addition, negotiators should be prepared to discuss details of a project
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with Turks.

Basis of Trust – External and Internal
Conventional wisdom suggests that trust in the United States is based on contracts rather
than on relationships, and that the opposite is true for Mexicans. Given this, one would
expect US respondents to agree strongly with the statement ‘I trust the other party
because a contract has been negotiated and agreed on’, and Mexican respondents to
disagree. Our results demonstrate that this was not the case. While US respondents did
base trust on a negotiated and agreed-on contract, so did Mexican respondents – in fact,
significantly more so. Moreover, our findings indicate no significant difference between
the US and the Mexican response to the statement ‘I trust the other party because we
have developed a relationship’. Fifty-six percent of US respondents and 60% of
Mexican respondents agreed with this statement. The relationship orientation of US
respondents may reflect a growing emphasis in the United States on developing and
maintaining long-term relationships with suppliers and customers. Although contracts
are important, close relationships facilitate business processes, such as supply chain
management and JIT manufacturing, that are the hallmark of today’s industry leaders.

The Turkish response was also surprising, given the relationship orientation commonly
cited in negotiation guides (see Morrison et al., 1994). Only 28% of Turks place trust
in another party on the basis of a relationship that has been developed. Moreover,
fewer than half (46%) of the Turkish respondents agreed that trust in another party is
based on a contract. Taken together, these findings point to possible difficulties Turks
may have in establishing trust with others. Hofstede (2001) links low interpersonal
trust with collectivism, which appears paradoxical until one distinguishes between ingroups and out-groups. Of the four countries, Turkey has one of the lowest scores on
Individualism (Table 4). The tendency in collectivist cultures is to trust only ‘one of
us’ (Hofstede, 2001). Data from the most recent world values survey (Inglehart et al.,
2004) confirm Turks’ distrust of out-groups. Turks demonstrate a high degree of trust
for people of their own nationality (ranking sixth of the countries included in the
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survey), but a very low degree of trust for others (ranking last or close to it). Other
work (Hofstede, 2001) identifies a relationship between high power distance and low
‘faith in people’ – Turkey’s score on PDI is relatively high (Table 4). For these reasons, it
may be difficult for Turkish negotiators to trust others – with or without contracts or
relationships.

Finns base trust both on contracts (70%) and on relationships (71 %), as do a majority of
Mexicans (58% and 60%). GLOBE findings (House et al., 2004) indicate relatively
high ‘as is’ scores for both Finns (5.02) and Mexicans (4.18) with respect to spelling out
instructions and requirements in detail. That Mexicans base trust on relationships is not
surprising, given Mexico’s low IDV score (Table 4). In negotiations, Finnish
expectations are that the other party will be faithful and solid (Lewis, 2004), which may
provide insight into the Finnish orientation toward relationships as a basis for trust.

These findings suggest that negotiators should both build relationships and conclude
contracts with negotiators from the four countries included in this study.
Conventional wisdom about Mexicans and Turks and their reliance on relationships,
rather than contracts, may be misleading – our findings do not support this tendency.

Form of Agreement – Explicit Contract and Implicit Agreement
Respondents from all countries expect and depend on written agreements to outline and
enforce the commitments between the two parties. In addition, respondents from all
countries also show a preference, to some extent, for broad contracts that allow for a
good working relationship to evolve. These findings are consistent with neither
conventional wisdom nor research-based findings. Hofstede (2001) notes that things
that are self-evident in collectivist cultures must be stated explicitly in individualist
cultures. Also noted is that collectivist cultures rely on relationships. Based on IDV
scores (Table 4), one would expect businesspeople from the United States and Finland
to rely on contracts to enforce commitments, and businesspeople from Turkey and
Mexico to rely on the relationship between the two parties instead of a contract. This
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is not the case.

Supporting the importance of clearly spelled out obligations in Mexico and Turkey
are ‘should be’ scores for these countries in the GLOBE project (House et al., 2004).
Additionally, Lewis (2004) sheds light on the Finnish orientation toward
relationship, indicating that Finns simply expect the other party to adhere to
mutually agreed-on obligations. While on the surface it may be surprising that US
respondents were not as contract-oriented as conventional wisdom might indicate, our
findings may reflect a shift in US orientation brought about by continuous and specific
criticisms of US negotiators during the 1980s and 1990s – which said they were too
focused on pushing the contract to the detriment of social relationships. Researchers
have called for businesspeople to be ‘cross pollinators’ and ‘fertilizers’ that span
different cultural environments (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1992). The explosion in global
trade over the past decade and the diffusion of best business practices across the globe
may have simultaneously increased the relationship sensitivities of US negotiators,
and increased the contract sensitivities of negotiators in countries such as Mexico and
Turkey, which have traditionally relied more heavily on relationships as a mechanism for
compliance.

A clear implication of this finding is that negotiators should realize that the goals of a
signed contract and of building a relationship are not necessarily mutually exclusive,
and that the achievement of one can lead to the other. Also, as business practices change
over time as a result of global diffusion, one should be wary of the conventional
thinking that negotiators from the United States are contract-oriented and those
from Mexico and Turkey are relationship-oriented.

Next Steps
One of the more interesting findings of our study is not about cultural differences in
negotiation; rather it is about how the field has historically conceptualized possible
differences. Our results imply that some dimensions typically presented as bipolar
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and one-dimensional are actually multifaceted. In the example noted earlier, Most
Significant Type of Issue is not a one-dimensional construct – instead, it refers to a
cluster of different but related tendencies. This suggests the need to ask colleagues in
nations very different from the United States to propose variants on the constructs in the
Weiss and Stripp model and, further, to propose additional constructs. Similarly, it
suggests that we should also ask these colleagues to generate items reflecting each
construct in their own language, and to provide translations into English.
Our study has several limitations. We had single-item scales for five constructs, and for
the three other constructs our reliability scores were modest. In the future, qualitative
research must be conducted with negotiation professionals to explore the possibility of two
separate dimensions for each of the original bipolar dimensions and multiple items
generated for these separate dimensions. Also, we measured the orientations that
businesspeople bring to a negotiation, without differentiating between domestic and
international contexts. We acknowledge that respondents’ negotiating styles may vary
depending on whether their counterparts are from the same country or from another
country. Another limitation is the use of a ‘pseudo-etic’ approach (Triandis and Marin
1983), where we used items developed in the United States to explore tendencies in
other cultures. As we noted earlier, future work will need to focus on generating items
in other countries as well.

Conclusion
In summary, the results reveal that constructs frequently presented as bipolar may not be.
Rather than demonstrating an orientation toward one pole of a continuum to the
exclusion of the other, respondents from all four countries were often oriented toward
both. Similar to the results of individual-level research about individualism and
collectivism (Oyserman et al., 2002), constructs that the negotiation literature treats
as bipolar appear to be better understood as distinct dimensions.

The results also demonstrate that use of a dimensional framework allows for meaningful
cross-national comparison. Negotiators can use the dimensions in a framework to
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systematically identify possible areas of tension, thereby making it possible to
appropriately adjust their expectations and negotiation practices accordingly.
Although the findings of this study are limited to four countries, because these
countries are drawn from four different cultural clusters, they point to the likelihood of
wider generalizability. Second, negotiators can use a framework to develop insight into
their own orientations. Using basis of trust as an example, a negotiator who is oriented
toward contracts and relationships, develops a more fine-grained self-awareness of
his or her style. It is no longer acceptable, accurate, or useful – if it ever was – for a US
negotiator to expect a Mexican counterpart to be relationship-oriented, or a US
counterpart to be contract-oriented. Our findings point to the inherent inaccuracy of
what Osland and Bird (2000) have referred to as ‘sophisticated stereotyping’. If it is
trite to note that international negotiations are highly complex affairs, then it should
not come as a surprise to find that the negotiators themselves are similarly complex.
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Figure 1
The negotiation orientations framework
Dimensions
1. Basic Concept of Negotiation

Distributive

Integrative

2. Most Significant Type of Issue

Task-based

Relationship-based

3. Selection of Negotiators

Abilities

Status

4. Influence of Individual Aspirations

Individualist

Collectivist

5. Internal Decision-making Process

Independent

Consensus

6. Orientation Toward Time

Monochronic

Polychronic

7. Risk-taking Propensity

Risk-averse

Risk-tolerant

8. Basis of Trust

External to the parties

Internal to the parties

9. Concern with Protocol

Formal

Informal

10. Style of Communication

Low-context

High-context

11. Nature of Persuasion

Factual-inductive

Affective

12. Form of Agreement

Explicit

Implicit
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Table 1
Conventional wisdom about negotiation in four countries*
Dimension

Finland

Mexico

Turkey

United States

Basic Concept

Finns seek

Mexicans have

Look for

of Negotiation:

cooperative

a win-win

mutual gains,

Distributive or

solutions at

attitude.

whenever

Integrative

early stages and

possible.

are intransigent
once positions
are taken.
Most

Finns have a

Mexicans are

Establish

Establish

Significant

task

relationship

relationships

rapport quickly,

Type of Issue:

orientation.

oriented.

before

then ‘get down

negotiating.

to business’.

Task-Related or
Relationshipbased
Basis of Trust:

Finns do not

Trust is based

Heavy reliance

External or

trust words.

on personal

on the legal

relationships.

system.

Internal

Lawyers may
be involved
from start to
finish.
Form of

Agreements are

Words are not a

Emphasize the

Agreement:

adhered to and

binding

contract and the

Explicit

relied upon.

commitment to

fine points of

Contract or

Statements are

action.

an agreement.

Implicit

promises.

Relationships

Contract

ensure followthrough.
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* These recommendations are drawn from a variety of sources, including Business
Mexico (2002); CultureGrams (2005); Elashmawi (2001); Fisher and Ury (1991); Hall
and Hall (1990); Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (2000); Investor’s Business Daily
(2004); Kras (1989); Lewis (2004); Moran and Stripp (1991); and Morrison et al.
(1994).
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Table 2
Scale and item correlations

BCN-D

BCN-D

BCN-I

MST-T

MST-R

BOT-E

BOT-I

FOA-EC

FOA-IA

1

-.334*

.232*

-.185*

-.021

-.160*

.073*

.057

1

-.092*

.349*

.153*

.284*

.090*

.075*

1

-.097*

-.032

-.109*

.066*

.044

1

.138*

.311*

.078*

.040

1

.398*

.181*

.081*

1

.057

.180*

1

-.066*

BCN-I
MST-T
MST-R
BOT-E
BOT-I
FOA-EC
FOA-IA

1

*Significant at p = .05.

31

Table 3
Negotiating tendency means, standard deviations and Tukey’s HSD for Finland, Mexico, Turkey, and the USA
Means and standard deviations

Negotiation Tendencies

Tukey’s HSD
Fin

Fin

Fin

Mex

Mex

Turk

Fin

Mex

Turk

USA

Mex

Turk

USA

Turk

USA

USA

3.31 1

2.78

2.19

3.11

+2

+

NS

+

+

+

(0.914) (0.808)

(0.764)

(0.802)

1.47

2.28

1.77

NS

+

+

+

+

+

(0.473) (0.548)

(0.728)

(0.594)

Task-related

3.70

2.60

2.54

+

+

+

+

+

NS

Details

(0.917) (1.082)

(1.090)

(0.981)

Relationship-based: Trust and Friendship

1.56

2.30

2.01

NS

+

+

+

NS

+

(0.768) (0.826)

(1.008)

(0.867)

External

2.36

2.48

2.67

2.83

NS

+

+

NS

+

NS

Internal

2.29

2.43

3.04

2.56

NS

+

+

+

NS

+

(0.991) (0.897)

(0.874)

(0.912)

1.98

2.19

2.15

NS

+

NS

NS

NS

NS

(0.849) (0.810)

(0.751)

(0.680)

3.10

2.80

3.06

+

+

NS

+

+

+

(1.048)

(0.927)

1. Basic Concept of Negotiation (BCN)
Distributive

Integrative

1.58

2. Most Significant Type of Issue (MST)
2.91

1.79

3. Basis of Trust (BOT)

4. Form of Agreement (FOA)
Explicit Contract

Implicit Agreement

2.14

2.40

(1.254) (1.015)
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1

Scale: 1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree

2

Significant difference, p <.05.
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Table 4
Selected Hofstede (2001) and GLOBE Project findings
Hofstede

GLOBE: Assertiveness

MAS

IDV

PDI

UAI

‘As Is’

‘Should Be’

Finland

26

63

33

59

3.81

3.68

Mexico

69

30

81

82

4.45

3.79

Turkey

45

37

66

85

4.53

2.66

USA

62

91

40

46

4.55

4.32
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Table 5
Cultural tendencies in negotiation: implications for preparation and behavior
Dimension

Do

Do not

Basic Concept of

Acquire knowledge about

Assume that an integrative

Negotiation: Distributive or

general attitudes of

approach will be appealing.

Integrative

individual negotiators.

When Turks or Mexicans

Turks are as likely to be

adopt a distributive attitude,

distributive as integrative.

emphasize your concessions

Mexicans may also be

and their gains.

distributive.
Most Significant Type of

Build rapport with Finns by

Begin negotiations with

Issue:

laying out the general

Finns by discussing details

Task-Related or

themes and principles

of the project.

Relationship-based

behind the negotiations.

Basis of Trust: External or

Establish relationships with

Assume that Mexican and

Internal

Finnish negotiators.

Turkish negotiators are not
focused on concluding a
contract.

Form of Agreement:

Negotiate specific contract

Expect that broad or vague

terms in Mexico and Turkey

language in a contract will
be acceptable to most
negotiators in Finland,
Mexico, Turkey, and the
US.
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Appendix 1
Scales for Four Negotiating Tendencies
Dimension

Scale Items

Reliabilities

Basic Concept of Negotiation

BCN1: In dealing with negotiations, I believe

Pan-cultural:

.68

Distributive (BCN-D)

that there will be a winner and a loser.

Finland:

.65

BCN3: When negotiating, it’s important for

Mexico:

.56

my team to establish dominance over the other

Turkey:

.58

party.

USA:

.70

BCN4: It is important to me that my
negotiating team comes away with the better
deal.
Basic Concept of Negotiation

BCN5: In negotiations, I believe that mutually

Pan-cultural:

.68

Integrative (BCN-I)

beneficial solutions can be reached.

Finland:

.50

BCN11: When negotiating, I seek information

Mexico:

.56

about the other party’s needs so that we can

Turkey:

.57

achieve a mutually beneficial outcome.

USA:

.70

BCN12: When negotiating, I provide
information about my own organization’s
interests so that we can achieve a mutually
beneficial outcome.
Most Significant Type of Issue

MST7: When negotiating, it is most

Task-related (MST-T)

important to focus on the details.

Most Significant Type of Issue

MST17: It is important to build trust

Relationship-based (MST-R)

and friendship with members of the
other negotiating team.

Basis of Trust

BOT47: I trust the other party because

External (BOT-E)

a contract has been negotiated and
agreed upon.
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Basis of Trust

BOT49: I trust the other party because

Internal (BOT-I)

we have developed a relationship.

Form of Agreement

FOA67: I expect to generate a legally

Pan-cultural:

.59

Explicit Contract (FOA-EC)

binding contract in negotiations.

Finland:

.60

FOA68: I depend on written

Mexico:

.57

agreements to make it clear what each

Turkey:

.54

party has agreed to do.

USA:

.69

Form of Agreement

FOA69: I prefer broad contracts to

Implicit Agreement (FOA-IA)

allow for a good working relationship
to evolve.
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